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INTRODUCTION

Increasingly, regulatory agencies are adopting ex ante rules to set market
access terms and conditions for network industries. Ex ante rules provide
forward-looking, predictable and clear standards to guide conduct in markets.
At the same time, in industries such as telecommunications and electric power
transmission and distribution, antitrust laws play an important role in defining
the terms and conditions of market access. Liability in this context is often
backward-looking, and the rules are often not as predictable or clear in their
enforcement. Antitrust liability is a good example of how courts play an
important ex post enforcement role in defining market conduct. A major

* This Essay elaborates on comments delivered at the Fourth Quello Communications
Law and Policy Symposium, The State of Telecom: Realities, Regulation, Restructuringin
Washington, D.C. on February 27, 2003.
** Harry M. Walborsky Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, Florida
State University College of Law. Professor Rossi has also taught at the University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill, the University of Texas School of Law, and Chicago-Kent College of
Law. He is co-author of Energy, Economics and the Environment (2000), and several law
journal articles on regulatory law. An ex officio member of the Executive Council of the
American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, he has
served as Co-Chair of its Committee on State Administrative Procedure. He graduated with
high distinction from University of Iowa College of Law, where he was an articles editor for the
Iowa Law Review, and also holds an LL.M. from Yale Law School, where he was an Olin
Fellow.
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challenge for regulatory law is striking an effective balance between ex ante
and ex post regulatory mechanisms.
In this essay, I address the filed rate doctrine, a legal principle that
determines when courts, rather than regulatory agencies, may serve as a
standard-setter for or arbiter of market terms, independent of their widelyaccepted role as the reviewer of decisions by an agency, such as the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). I begin by discussing the issue in the
context of electric power deregulation. Then, I turn to the telecommunications
context, in which the points of departure for this issue after the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,' are the Seventh Circuit's Goldwasserv.
Ameritech Corp.2 decision and the Second Circuit's Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.' case, which is currently pending before
the United States Supreme Court. I argue that ex post enforcement has an
important role to play in deregulated markets and should not be ignored where
a regulatory agency is not actively applying ex ante rule to guide market
conduct.
I. NETWORK ACCESS AND FILED RATES IN ELECTRIC POWER
The electric power industry faces remarkably similar institutional
governance issues to those facing telecommunications.
As in the
telecommunications context, some of these issues are federalism based. For
example, the Supreme Court's opinion last year in New York v. Federal
Energy RegulatoryCommission4 has implications for electric power regulation
similar to decisions that limit the scope of state authority in
telecommunications. Outside of this federalism issue another institutional
governance issue relates to the respective spheres of agency and judicial
regilation. Here, the filed rate doctrine does a lot of heavy lifting in
determining when courts will intervene in the enforcement of market norms
for electric power as well as telecommunications.
A. Network Access and Otter Tail
Before exploring the implications of the filed rate doctrine, it is useful
to examine the promise of the antitrust principles for an industry like electric

1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
18 and 47 U.S.C.).
2. 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).
3. 294 F.3d 307 (2dCir. 2002), cert.grantedsubnom.,VerizonCommunications, Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., _U.S..__, 123 S. Ct. 1480 (2003).
4. _U.S.__, 122S.Ct. 1012(2002).
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power. The network features of electric power infrastructure allow a
monopolist the ability to control a bottleneck facility (power transmission) to
effectively foreclose competition in either upstream, such as power generation
or downstream (power distribution) markets.
As the Supreme Court recognized in the classic Otter TailPower Co. v.
United States,' in order for competition to thrive in downstream markets
(power distribution markets were at issue in that case) physical access to
network transmission facilities is necessary.6 In OtterTail, the Supreme Court
upheld a district court's order requiring interconnection with such
transmission facilities, drawing on earlier cases, such as United States v.
Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis.7 The principle that Otter Tail
applied-known today as the "essential facilities" doctrine-is fundamental to
market access in electric power. This principle also has significant impact in
the telecommunications industry, as is evidenced by Judge Greene's decision
in UnitedStates v. AT&TCo. 8 and the Seventh Circuit's MCI Communications
Corp. v. AT&T Co.'
Federal courts have at their disposal fairly broad powers to implement
these sorts of principles through the issuance of treble damages (an ex post
remedy) or by issuing an injunction that requires interconnection, which might
take on the role of an ex ante remedy. In exercising these powers, however,
courts recognize the importance of respecting the agency's jurisdictional turf.
For instance, in Otter Tailthe Supreme Court emphasized how, after it upheld
the district court's injunction requiring interconnection, the district court
would retainjurisdiction necessary and proper to ensure that the antitrust laws
were enforced. The Court stated:
The decree of the District Court has an open end by which the court retains
jurisdiction 'necessary or appropriate' to carry out the decree or 'for the modification
of any of the provisions.'
It also contemplates that future disputes over
interconnections and the terms and conditions governing those interconnections will
be subject to Federal Power Commission perusal. It will be time enough to consider
whether the antitrust remedy may override the power of the Commission... if, and
when the Commission denies the interconnection and the District Court nevertheless
0
undertakes to direct it.'

5.
6.
7.
8.
U.S. 1001
9.
10.

410 U.S. 366 (1973).
See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
224 U.S. 383 (1912).
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460
(1983).
708 F.2d 1081, 1105 (7th Cir. 1983).
Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 376-77.

Michigan State DCL Law Review

[Vol. 3:717

Implicitly, the Supreme Court was recognizing that the agency had primary
jurisdiction for purposes of determining the rates for access, but antitrust law
principles enforced by courts also had an important role to play.
B. The Strands of the Filed Rate Doctrine
The filed rate doctrine can keep courts from even considering the merits
of such issues. Historically, the filed rate doctrine concerned itself with
protecting consumers against nondiscrimination in utility service rates. A
utility with a filed tariff is prohibited from offering customers rebates and
discounts that are at odds with the filed (and often approved) tariff. In
addition to inherent fairness, a non-economic goal, the non-discrimination
principle behind this doctrine also has an economic purpose. The general idea
behind prohibiting price discrimination is to preclude the monopolist from
using its market power to extend its monopoly into secondary markets."
The filed rate doctrine's origins may be in protecting against price
discrimination, but there are two other strands to the doctrine that play an
important role for industries, such as electric power.
First, there is a federal preemption strand to the filed rate doctrine. For
example, in the electric power context, the Ninth Circuit invoked the filed rate
doctrine to bar California's governor from commandeering expensive
wholesale power contracts during the state's recent deregulation crisis. 2 The
court's rationale for invoking the doctrine in that case was that the state's
action would present a conflict with a tariff filed with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC). While the court relied on the filed rate
doctrine, it was really making a determination that federal preemption
precluded a state regulatory action. It is unclear what, if anything, giving a
filed rate an independent, legally significant status in such cases
accomplishes. '3
Second, and most relevant in the consideration of federal antitrust
claims, there is an agency deference strand to the doctrine. The leading case
on this is Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.,'4 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1922." 5 Keogh held that a private antitrust plaintiff is
precluded from recovering treble damages against a carrier based on the claim

11. For discussion, see Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial
Enforcement in the DeregulatoryEra, 56 VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003).
12. See Duke Energy Trading& Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2001).
13. In fact, I have argued that reference to filed rates can lead courts to overreaching
preemption conclusions. See Rossi, supra note 11.
14. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
15. See Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
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that a tariff filed with the interstate commerce commission was allegedly
monopolistic. Noting that section eight of the Interstate Commerce Act gave
shippers injured by illegal rates actual damages plus attorney's fees, Justice
Brandeis reasoned that the issue ofrates is best determined by the agency, not
by a court." Thus, applying a deference-type principle, Keogh invoked
another strand of the filed rate doctrine. 7
This agency deference strand has also been used to bar antitrust claims
in the deregulated electric power industry. For example, in Town ofNorwood
v. New EnglandPower Co.,'" the First Circuit invoked the Keogh strand of the
filed rate doctrine to bar a price squeeze claim against a utility-even where the
tariff filed with FERC was a market-based tariff relying on competitively set
prices. 9 The Norwood court reasoned, "[i]t is thefiling of the tariffs, and not
any affirmative approval or scrutiny by the agency, that triggers the filed rate
doctrine"2
The approach of courts in applying the filed rate doctrine to the electric
power industry can lead to problematic-even harmful-results.
The
conventional understanding is that the file rate doctrine, by respecting
regulatory over market determinations, can stand in the way of deregulation.
By contrast, cases such as Town ofNorwood may allow the filed rate doctrine
to lead to even more radical deregulation-that is, markets absent even
common law and antitrust remedies-than either Congress or the regulatory
agencies accepting tariffs would prefer. Specifically, to the extent the filed
rate doctrine is used by courts as a basis to decline jurisdiction, private firms
might look to ex ante tariffing as a strategy to foreclose antitrust or common
law litigation, thus reducing the possibility of ex post judicial meddling.
Allowing private conduct to determine the institutional forum for market
enforcement leads to a serious bias againstjudicial enforcement. The problem
with this bias, as I see it, is that it privileges private choice over public
assessment of the effectiveness of dual enforcement.
Reliance on private forum selection for a regulatory enforcement
mechanism poses a particularly costly problem as we move from cost-ofservice based regulation to a different approach to regulating markets,
focusing on inputs or the structure of access to important facilities for
competition. In industries like electric power, the judiciary has a comparative
institutional competence that has a lot to offer markets and market
enforcement regimes. Courts, unlike regulatory agencies, do not depend on

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See Keogh, 260 U.S. at 162-64.
See id.
202 F.3d 408 (1st Cir. 2000).
See Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408 (1st Cir. 2000).
Town of Norwood,202 F.3d at 419.
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budget allocations or limited statutory jurisdiction for their enforcement
authority. Courts have greater political independence. Courts have wider
remedial authority and discovery powers than do agencies.
Thus, at least in electric power, I believe the fundamental issues relating
to the application of doctrines, like the essential facilities doctrine, are
properly considered by courts, as well as by agencies. I do not think that the
filed rate doctrine, in particular, should no longer be used as the defense to
claims brought in court, particularly given the extent to which it privileges
private choice over assessment of the public interest. At times courts must
respect the agencies' turf, but existing doctrines, such as regulatory
preemption, primary jurisdiction and antitrust immunity, provide a more
complete assessment of the public interest in the judicial enforcement
decision."
II. THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE IN DEREGULATED TELECOMMUNICATIONS
MARKETS: BEYOND GOLDWASSER

Against the backdrop of this critique of the filed rate doctrine in the
electric power context, I want to compare the doctrine's effects in the
telecommunications industry.
As in electric power, in telecommunications there is a well-established
federal preemption strand to the doctrine. AT&T Co. v. Central Office
Telephone Co.22 invoked the filed rate doctrine to preclude state law tort and
breach of contract suits against a carrier with filed tariffs. 3 That case
involved the federal preemption doctrine, but with federal detariffing of
telecommunications (something electric power has yet to experience) it seems
that the federal preemption strand of the doctrine, while still marginally
relevant, will fade away.
While the preemption strand seems to be fading, in the last few years the
agency deference strand of the doctrine has begun to take on a life of its own
for telecommunications. The leading case on this, Goldwasserv. Ameritech
Corp.,2 4 decided by the Seventh Circuit in 2000, barred a court's consideration
of an essential facilities antitrust complaint by direct consumers of
Ameritech's local telephone services. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
antitrust complaint was "inextricably linked" to the plaintiff's allegations that
section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 had been violated.25

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

The argument is developed more completely in Rossi, supra note 11.
524 U.S. 214 (1998).
See AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel. Co., 524 U.S. 214 (1998).
222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).
See Goldwasser v. Ameritech, 222 F.3d 390, 401 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Goldwasserreached this result despite the antitrust savings clause of the 1996
Act, which states "nothing in this act or the amendments made by this act shall
be construed to modify, impair or supersede the applicability of any of the
antitrust laws. 26
To be kind, the reasoning in Goldwasseris unclear and confused. The
court specifically stated that it was not conferring antitrust immunity, instead
basing its decision on the court's conclusion that that the plaintiffs had failed
to allege anything under the auspices of an antitrust complaint that could be
divorced from a claim under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.27
Notwithstanding the court's characterization, to me this looks a lot like
implied antitrust immunity-especially to the extent that the court drew on
general principles of statutory construction. For example, the court's primary
argument was that the 1996 Act is more specific legislation that must take
precedence over the general antitrust laws where the two cover precisely the
same field. Traditionally formulated antitrust immunity analysis, however,
could not possibly have led the court to this conclusion. Generally, to imply
antitrust immunity, a court must find a "plain repugnancy"-an
inconsistency-between the regulatory statute and antitrust laws,2 not
complimentary standards, as the Goldwassercourt seemed to assume.
Perhaps after recognizing how strained this reasoning really is, the
Seventh Circuit concluded its opinion in Goldwasserby stating that the filed
rate doctrine also precludes consideration of the antitrust claim under Keogh
and its progeny-the old line of cases involving the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The court concluded that, "the plaintiffs cannot pursue their
damages claim under the 1996 Act because the monopoly claim these
plaintiffs are trying to assert necessarily implicates the rates Ameritech is
charging."29 Thus, like Keogh, Goldwasseris a classic agency deference filed
rate case. The opinion, though, contains little discussion of how Ameritech's
rates were determined and by whom-federal or state regulators-inviting
private choices (or at least the opportunity for private choices) to determine
the regulatory forum. As I have argued, this can be a problem for electric
power regulation and it may also be a problem for telecommunications.
Thus, I believe it fortunate that other circuits have not bindly followed
the approach of Goldwasser. Last year, in Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,

26. 47 U.S.C. § 152 (historical and statutory notes); Telecommunications Act of 1996
§ 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. 143.
27. See Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 401.
28. See, e.g., Friedman v. Salomon/Smith Barney, Inc., 313 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 2002)
(emphasizing whether antitrust claim presents a "plain repugnancy" to Congress' intended
regulatory program).
29. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 402.
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L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,3" the Second Circuit refused to endorse
Goldwasser's use of the filed rate doctrine and antitrust immunity.3 In that
case, the claim was better pled to isolate the antitrust claims from claims
brought under section 251. The court refused to endorse Goldwasser's
analysis under the filed rate doctrine, thus considering the merits of the
alleged antitrust misconduct.
The apparent "split" between the Seventh and Second Circuits is heading
to the Supreme Court, so regulatory lawyers are keeping a careful eye on how
the Court will resolve this issue. But it is not at all clear that there is a direct
conflict between the circuits. Scholars writing on Goldwasserhave observed
that the case is readily distinguishable from others if courts read Goldwasser
narrowly to focus on what is pled.32 This would limit Goldwasser's
endorsement of the filed rate doctrine to poorly-pled pleadings, where
plaintiffs have not separately pled antitrust violations.
This reading of Goldwasseris consistent with other circuit and district
court cases that do not allow the filed rate doctrine, or the bizarre antitrust
immunity of Goldwasser,to serve as a basis for rejecting antitrust claims. For
example, in Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp.,33 decided last
year, the Eleventh Circuit also rejected the approach of Goldwasser, allowing
a competitor monopoly leveraging claim to survive summary judgment.3 4 That
case is not as quite as explicit as Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, L.L.P. in its
rejection of Goldwasser- to the extent that it is a competitor suit - but its
spirit is inconsistent with Goldwasser. District courts in Ohio35 and
California36 also have rejected the Goldwasserapproach to antitrust immunity.
In granting certiorari to consider Curtis V Trinko, at least four members
of the Supreme Court appear to agree with the United States Solicitor General
that the case presents a "matter of substantial importance" if not a Circuit
30. 294 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002).
31. See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 294 F.3d 307
(2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted sub nom., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis
V. Trinko, L.L.P.,
U S.__, 123 S. Ct. 1480 (2003).
32. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, UnderstandingStatutoryBundles: Does the Sherman
Act Come with the 1996 TelecommunicationsAct? (Jan. 2003) (Working Paper, University of
Chicago Law School, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_176200/177.rcp.bundles.pdf), at 3; Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, The Telcom Act, andReflections
on Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 5 (2003).
33. 299 F.3d 1272 (1lth Cir. 2002).
34. See Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (1 Ith Cir.
2002).
35. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. CoreComm Newco, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 810 (N.D. Ohio
2002).
36. See Stein v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 975 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Davis v. Par.
Bell, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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conflict.3 7 It seems, however, that aside from poorly pled complaints, as in
Goldwasser, the line of cases outside of the Seventh Circuit makes some
sense. The filed rate doctrine should not play a role in barring antitrust claims
in the telecommunications context. In telecommunications, as in electric
power, the filed rate doctrine is unnecessary-and it may prove harmful to the
extent it allows antitrust enforcement decisions to hinge on the private choices
of regulated firms in tariffing.
In telecommunications, as in electric power, the doctrine should be
reassessed. Instead of using filed tariffs to decline judicial consideration of
antitrust matters, courts should focus their attention on doctrines that better
protect the public interest as they assess the issue of institutional governance.
There are important principles of antitrust law that apply here-the essential
facilities doctrine the most important among them-and thejudiciary has a role
to play in enforcing these. Lifting the shield of the filed tariff doctrine will
allow courts the flexibility that they need to ensure adequate remedies against
monopolistic conduct in deregulated markets.
CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by clarifying that I am not advocating that regulatory
agencies are never relevant to the application of the network access principles
of antitrust law or their enforcement. Agencies are relevant to the
enforcement of antitrust principles and have an important role to play
alongside courts.
At the same time, other doctrines-antitrust immunity (properly applied),
primary jurisdiction, or federal preemption doctrine-are more than adequate
for dealing with the duel enforcement issues courts face. Moreover, these
doctrines are not as harmful as the filed rate doctrine. The filed rate doctrine
allows private tariffing to foreclose ex post judicial enforcement of antitrust
principles. As I have argued, this risks more radical deregulation than
Congress or agencies would intend. By contrast, these other doctrines pay
attention to the public interest in enforcement, evaluating more carefully
legislative and agency schemes.
For example, I think that the Goldwassercourt could have avoided the
filed rate issue altogether, considering the issue under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, to the extent the court was concerned with the implications of
judicial enforcement for the FCC's regulatory scheme. For the Seventh
Circuit's concerns to have materialized in Goldwasser, a federal or state
37. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae,
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. (No. 02-682) at 20
(May 23, 2003).
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agency would need to actively regulate and enforce the conduct of concern.
Staying the antitrust claim pending resolution of the section 25 138 claimbefore
the agency might have better respected the antitrust principles that are
important to network industries. Indeed, this is consistent with the approach
taken in Otter Tail. The Otter Tail decision emphasized that the district court,
even when it issued its injunction, retained jurisdiction necessary and proper
for purposes of ensuring compliance with the antitrust laws, notwithstanding
the agency's role in mandating access and setting access prices. 39
Given the importance of these antitrust principles to network access in
competitive markets, the filed rate doctrine does little more than allow firmspecific private behavior to determine-or play an important role in
determining-the regulatory forum for enforcement. For this reason, I think
that courts ought to abandon the filed tariff doctrine, taking up increased
adjudication of antitrust claims where the public interest warrants. Other
safeguards can adequately determine when the public interest is balanced
against judicial enforcement ex post and in favor of ex ante agency regulation
of market inputs.

38. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
39. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,376 (1973); see alsosupra
note 10 and accompanying text.

